DAWN Editorials June 2022 Issue
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DAWN Editorials September 2022 Issue
DETERRENCE
In its simplest form, deterrence consists of the following threat, intended to dissuade a state from aggression: ‘Do not attack me because if you do, something unacceptably horrible will happen to you.’ In other words, deterrence is a form of persuasion in military strategy. To convey such a threat, the deterrer must decide what constitutes an attack, and must then decide what level of response would be adequate to deter it. This in turn depends on the deterrer’s estimation of the adversary’s intentions and the values it places on them. For deterrence to succeed, the threat must also be credible. Not only must the potential aggressor believe that the costs of an attack would be higher than its benefits, but also that there is a significant likelihood that such costs would indeed be incurred.
Deterrence: Theory and practice with special reference to Nuclear India and Pakistan
Theories of deterrence, which put forward propositions about the nature and mechanisms of deterrence, were mostly developed during the first Cold War era (1945-1963) and dealt with the US-Soviet confrontation. The theory of nuclear deterrence is largely an American product, though there were significant British and French theorists. The troubled relations between India and Pakistan have been a rapidly evolving laboratory for nuclear deterrence theory. A review of the deterrence literature suggests several facets of deterrence theory that are relevant in the India- Pakistan context. Deterrence is an old phenomenon which received new significance with the development of the atomic bomb. Discussions of deterrence often start with a Roman proverb, Si vis pacem, para bellum: If one wants peace, prepare for war.